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Stanford University, Stanford, CA and Columbia University, New York,
U.SA .
ABSTRACT
To explain the patterns of world trade of resources, this paper combines the bio-
logical dynamics of the renewable resource and game theoretical explanations
of its extraction under different property regimes, with a general equilibrium
model of North South trade (Chichilnisky, 1981, 1986). The two regions pro-
duce, consume and trade two goods using two inputs, a renewable resource E
and capital . To expose the importance of property rights in explaining trade,
the two regions are taken as identical except for the property rights regimes on
the pool from which the resource is extracted : the South has common property
and the North private property. The paper formulates the Nash equilibrium of
a game which explains the harvesting of the resource under different property
rights regimes : more is supplied at each price under unregulated property rights
than it is with private property (Lemma 1) . Theorem 1 proves that the difference
in property rights by itself explains trade between otherwise identical regions :
the South exports the environmentally intensive product even though it has no
comparative advantage and the North the capital intensive products . The North
overconsumes the resource intensive products which it imports at prices which
are below social costs . This occurs even though in equilibrium the prices of all
goods and all factors of production are equal across the world . Resources are
overextracted and the world pattern of consumption and trade of resources is
Pareto inefficient. Several policies which could redress the inefficiency, particu-
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larly recent property rights policies towards biodiversity and land ownership in
the Americas, are discussed in this paper.
1 . INTRODUCTION
The global environment can be described by the physical dynamics and the
economic use of the earth's resources . It has become, t a certain extent, a North-
South issue .2 Developing countries tend to specialize in the production and the
export of goods which deplete environmental resources such as rain forests, or
minerals whose combustion leads to the emission ofgreenhouse gases . Currently
two thirds of the exports from Latin America are resources, and resources make
an even higher proportion of Africa's exports . Most of these resources are
imported and consumed by the industrial countries . For example, most of the
world's production of wood pulp is consumed in the industrial countries, as is
the petroleum exported by developing countries . The result is that industrial
countries account for approximately 75% of the world's C02 emissions : the
US alone consumes 25-30% of the world's oil production yearly (Chichilnisky,
1994x) . When trying to define precisely the concept of sustainable development
we are led therefore to question the role of international trade . 3 In practical
terms : are trade policies based on the traditional comparative advantages of
developing countries compatible with environmental preservation? Should the
developing countries export more resource and land intensive products such as
agricultural goods? Or should a new vision of international trade, one that is
more consistent with the world's environment, replace the old?
This paper studies these issues within a two region world economy where the
North represents the industrial countries and the South the developing countries .
I consider a class of environmental issues arising from the use of renewable
environmental resources as inputs to the production of traded goods . Typical
examples are rain forests used for timber, or destroyed to give way to the
production of cash crops such as coffee, sugar and palm oil . 4 In many developing
countries, these are unregulated common property resources (Dasgupta and Heal .
1979) whose ownership is shared with future generations (Arrow and Fisher.
1974).
It could be argued that sustainable development is all about the proper man-
agement of the world's renewable resources . If petroleum is replaced by fuels
based on biomass as currently done in parts of Brazil and Austria, and electricity
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is generated by wind or water power as is done in parts of Europe and the USA,
then even energy can be obtained from renewable resources . The atmosphere
can be considered a renewable or self-regenerating resource, as are bodies of
water, forests and fisheries . To a great extent the global environmental dilemma
is described by the dynamics of the productive use of the earth's renewable
resources .
Following the Heckscher-Ohlin simple and powerful formulation, the prob-
lem of North-South trade is studied here in a two region world with two goods
and two inputs of production each. I consider completely unregulated compet
itive economies which trade freely with each other in the international market.
There are, however, two significant departures from traditional trade theory. One
is that one input to production is an environmental resource . This environmental
resource is self-renewable and in principle exhaustible, such as a forest or a
fishery . Its population dynamics is represented by a differential equation which
describes the demographic progress of the species, its stock through time . The
ecological dynamics of the resource then merges with the functioning of the two
region market economy which uses the stock of the resource as an input to the
production of traded goods. Our concern is to study the impact that international
trade between the regions has on the progress of the species . The second major
departure from traditional theory is that the regions are characterized here by
their property rights regimes for the environmental resource to emphasize the
importance of property rights in explaining trade, the two regions are taken to
be identical in every way (same technologies, inputs, preferences) except in
the property rights regimes on a pool from which the renewable resources are
extracted . In the North property rights are well defined, while in the South the
environmental resource is common property .
It seems worth motivating this framework of analysis and relating it with the
traditional theory of international trade . The regions in a Heckscher-Ohlin world
differ solely in their relative factor endowments, and this difference suffices to
explains trade flows . However, endowments do not always explain observed trade
flows in environmental resources . For example Honduras is an active exporter of
wood to the US, even though the US is overwhelmingly richer in forested land
and Honduras relatively richer in labor. Ricardo's explanation of why countries
trade does not work in this context either, because US labor is more productive in
wood extraction than is Honduras' . It is worth observing however that Honduras'
forests are mostly a national property, while wood cutting in the US occurs
mostly in private land . Property rights in the two regions are different, with
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Honduras treating its forests as unregulated common property. Another example
is provided by the traditional rubber-toppers in the Amazon forest, who use the
forest as a common property renewable resource ; the Korub National Park in
Cameroon at 60 million years of age, one of the oldest rain forests in the world,
is also expioited as a common property resource to produce palm oil for the
international market (Ruitenbeck, 1990). In the industrial countries the situation
is quite different . Japan has well defined property rights for environmental
resources such as sun light. The US has an extensive legal infrastructure for
eliminating the overexploitation that accompanies common property resources,
such as the Hot Oil Act of 1936 and "unitization" laws (McDonald, 1971) .
Citizen's property rights towards the use of running water are well established
in the United Kingdom since the Middle Agess .
With such examples in mind, we consider two regions which differ solely
in their property rights regimes for an environmental resource which is used
as an input to production. It is important to distinguish property rights regimes
from the regulation of markets . We consider here competitive and unregulated
markets throughout . The environmental resource is renewable and in principle
exhaustible . If left on its own it follows its own ecological dynamics which we
represent by a standard differential equation . The equation is modified by the
economic use of the resource as an input to production.
We prove that due to the differences in property rights for the resource, in a
steady state the two regions will trade ; indeed this difference alone explains the
pattern of trade between the two regions. The difference in property rights for
the environmental resource is shown to lead to a market induced "comparative
abundance" of environmental inputs in the South, in the sense that at each
market price, the stable steady state extraction of the environmental resource
in the South exceeds that of the North, Lemma 1 . The resource extraction in
the South exceeds optimal extraction, so that there is overexploitation of the
resource . In some cases this can lead to the extinction of the species.
A market-induced "competitive advantage" in resources arises in the South
despite the fact that the two regions are identical in the economic sense: same
endowments, technologies and preferences . Furthermore, neither region has
environmental regulations, so that differences in market regulation do not explain
why the South exports resources to the North.
At a free and competitive market equilibrium, all prices, for the traded goods
and for all the inputs of production, are equal across the regions . Therefore the
exports of the South are not explained by the South having lower input prices.
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In the absence of any market intervention, it is shown that in a competitive
and unregulated market, differences in properly rights between the two regions
lead to a steady state pattern of international trade in which the South exports
environmentally intensive goods, and overextracts and uses its environmental
resources beyond what is Pareto efficient . In this world economy, international
trade is explained solely by the difference in property rights between the two
trading regions, Theorem 1 .
Gains from trade must now be redefined since neither Heckscher-Ohlin nor
Ricardo's concepts apply. This is achieved in Sections 2 and 3 . There may be
private gains from trade but due to the lack of property rights externalities in
the extraction of the resources are not internalized . As shown in Sections 3 and
4, under these conditions trade can lead to private gains but to social losses .
We define here the concepts of private and public comparative advantage and
of private and public gains from trade . The weaker are the property rights the
larger is the difference between private and public comparative advantage and
between private and public gains from trade . Private gains from trade in environ-
mentally intensive goods may be accompanied by public losses from trade, and
private comparative advantage may be accompanied by public comparative dis-
advantages . This leads us to question the extent to which traditional comparative
advantages in the developing countries are a good foundation for North-South
trade .
It seems worth noting that environmental overuse in the South does not occur
solely because the locals overconsume their resources, but because they export
these resources to a rich international market at prices which are below social
costs . This is why the global environmental issue is inextricably connected
with North-South trade . The South overproduces, but mostly because the North
overconsumes . The international market transmits and enlarges the externalities
of the global commons. No policy which ignores this connection can work.
Possible policy implications are discussed : they involve improving property
rights of the local users of the common resource . Examples of innovative inter-
national property rights arrangements between US industry and the localities
near rain forests in Central and South America are discussed . In addition, it
seems indicated to reconsider trade policies based on traditional comparative
advantages in the South. These policies promote the export of environmentally
intensive goods, such as wood products or cash crops . The World Bank has been
for many years, and still is, a strong promoter for such policies . One ought to
take into account the possible social losses in the South from following such
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policies, as well as the losses to the North. The overuse of resources in the South
is transmitted and enlarged by the international market and becomes a prob-
lem for the world economy. The resulting allocation is inefficient for the world
economy. Under these conditions, either property rights in the South must be
brought up to the level of the North's, or else trade policies based on traditional
comparative advantages ought to be de-emphasized as much as possible . The
production of agricultural products for the domestic market could be reasonably
carried out in the South, but products based on agriculture seem to be a poor
choice for their exports . Such products could be produced for domestic use in
the South, but exported by the North, which has a comparative advantage in
terms of agricultural productivity . The same holds for other environmentally
intensive products . This could of course mean an increase in the market price
of such products, but if so this would induce a more efficient use of resources,
and as such it should be welcome . In any case, the prices of environmentally
intensive goods may not necessarily increase if these are exported by the North.
Market prices reflect input prices as much as they reflect the productivity of
these inputs . Expensive but productive inputs could lead to lower prices: indeed
this is the experience of agricultural production in the industrial countries. The
South could emphasize, instead, skilled-labor intensive products, such as con-
sumer electronics, biotechnology, telecommunications and other manufactured
products which are produced under conditions of external economies of scale,
following the example of the new industrialized nations in Asia.
The theory of trade based on differential property rights presented here ini-
tiated in Chichilnisky (1991), and on the North-South model introduced in
Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) . The model and the results in this paper differ how
ever from the previous work in that the dynamics of the renewable resource
is crucial to our arguments, while all the other pieces consider instead static
economies . A distinctive feature of this paper is that we consider the dynamics
of the renewable resource which is used as an input to production, and how this
varies with different property rights regimes .
The paper is organized as follows . Lemma 1 studies the connection between
different property rights regimes and the steady state stock of the renewable
resource as a function of prices . On the basis of this result, Theorem 1 estab
lishes the patterns of trade implied by the difference in property rights in the
two regions. It shows that different property rights alone explain international
trade between countries, even when the countries are otherwise identical (same
technologies, preferences and endowments) . Corollary 1 explores the welfare
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
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implication of changes in property rights . Lemma 1, Theorem 1 and Corollary
1 apply to unregulated and competitive markets . Section 6 discusses property
rights policies . Section 7 is is a conclusion which summarizes the results . The
Appendix formalizes the model of North-South trade with variable property
rights for an environmental resource which is used as an input to production,
and it proves the uniqueness of a market equilibrium .
The results provide a foundation for the desirability of improving property
rights regimes, and, in this sense, support Coase's (1960) propositions within
the context of international markets. However, as pointed out in Chichilnisky
(1991), in our case the pattern of ownership of property rights matters . Not only
should property rights be well-defined, but the owners of these rights should have
appropriate economic characteristics and incentives, a point which Dasgupta and
Heal (1979) also make within a different context .
2. GAINS FROM TRADE : PRIVATE VS . SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
Environmental issues are generally conencted with Exernalities in production
and consumption . Externalities come in many forms. They occur for example
when the output of traded goods by one firm affects the production by others .
Here I shall address, instead, a class of environmental issues arising from the
use of environmental common property resources as inputs ofproduction . I shall
concentrate on studying the behavior of free markets in which the property
rights for the common property resources vary across regions . Of particular
interest is how property rights determine the patterns of trade in a free market
(general) equilibrium, as well as the pattern of environmental use across the
trading regions .
Consider, for example, a tropical forest which is a common property resource
used as an input to production of timber, palm oil, fish, trapping, fishing, and
pharmaceutical products based on its biodiversity. The fact that environmen
tal resources are common property resources leads inevitably to a divergence
between private and social costs (Dasgupta, 1990; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979;
Baumol and Oates, 1974) . Many of these are renewable resources . They can
be "produced" at a cost, up to a point, and used as crucial inputs to produc-
tion . "Overgrazing, overfishing, the depletion of trees and shrubs from common
land for use as fuel are familiar problems . They are traceable to the "common
property" nature of such resources as grazing land, fisheries and forest cover.
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So too with the drawing of water from aquifers which by the nature of things
must usually be common property even when the land covering the aquifer is
privately owned" (Dasgupta, 1990) .
Common property resources have the characteristic that one person's use
interferes with the use by others, and diminishes the productivity of the resource
to them . Hence private returns exceed social returns and there is overuse (Das
gupta and Heal, 1979). Because of the divergence between private and social
prices, any standard measurement of comparative advantages and of gains from
trade will be different if computed in terms of social costs than if computed with
private costs. Public and private gainsfrom trade will differ.
When the environment is taken seriously, and we have little choice in the
matter, the classical theorems on international comparative advantages and gains
from trade must be reconsidered . We must now account for public comparative
advantages and for public gains from trade . Obviously these could be very
different from their private counterparts .6 We turn now to the formalization of
this issue .
3. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OFNORTH-SOUTH TRADE :
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES
We shall study public vs . private comparative advantages and gainsfrom trade
within a general equilibrium model in which the environment enters as an input
of production . Environmental resource markets will be shown to reflect and
transmit all aspects of the private vs. public dilemmas . Through these markets,
environmental inputs have an impact on the general equilibrium of the econ-
omy: on the market price of goods, the distribution of income, the patterns of
consumption and international trade .
The model we define is a two goods, two inputs, two country model similar
to that of Heckscher-Ohlin (Ohlin, 1933), a version of the Arrow-Debreu model.
However, in terms of the underlying analytical structure there is a major differ
ence : the treatment of one of the inputs. This input is a renewable environmental
resource with its own ecological dynamics . From the steady state behavior of
this dynamics we derive the supply for the stock of the resource as a function of
its price . The supplies of inputs in this economy, capital h and environmental
resources E, are therefore price dependent, in contrast with the Heckscher-Ohlin
theory where they are, instead, fixed.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF RENEWABLERESOURCES
	
23
In the next section we derive the steady state behavior of the supply of the
resource as a function of prices. From the ecological dynamics of the resource
and its economic use, we derive a steady state relation between the quantity of the
extracted resource and the price of the resource, E' = E I (PE ) . This is generally
an increasing function so that we may also write its inverse PE = PE(E), where
pE is the price of a unit of the environmental resource E.7 In this sense the
model follows Chichilnisky's North-South model (1981, 1986) where inputs are
price dependent, but here the inputs of production are capital and environmental
resources, rather than capital and labor. A distinctive feature of this paper is that
we consider the dynamics of the renewable resource which is used as an input
to production, and how this varies with different property rights regimes . This
changes the analysis significantly, as shown in Lemma 1 and Theorem l . There
are two major differences with earlier versions of the North-South model. One is
that here one of the inputs is a common property resource and its supply curve is
shown to be determined by and to vary with, the structure of property rights in the
economy (Section 4) . In the North-South model (Chichilnisky, 1986) the inputs
are private goods, and their price-dependent supply curves are fixed throughout,
so that the impact of property rights on the supply ofcommon property resources
could not be examined . The effects of property rights regimes on the supply of
resources were also examined in Chichilnisky (1991), but only within a static
economy.
The model for one region is formalized as follows . There are two inputs
of production, K, capital, and E, the environmental resource . They are used to
produce two goods, A and B; B is more intensive in the use of the environmental
resources than A, which is more capital intensive. The production functions are
A = f(KA, EA) and B = g(KB, EB), both of which are concave and exhibit
constant returns to scale . A strictly concave homothetic utility function U(A, B )
for goods is postulated ; this could be considered the country's "community
preference" .g Initial endowments of E and K are given by the supply functions
PE = PE(E) and r = r(K), where PE denotes the price of the environmental
resource, and r the rental price of capital . Es = Es(PE) is derived in the next
section from the ecological dynamics of the renewable resource interacting with
the optimal economic extraction rate . Here it suffices to note that both of these
functions are continuous and increasing in their arguments, and in particular,
invertible, E = E(pE) and K = K(r) . One of the goods, A, is the numeraire,
i .e . PA = l . Since endowments, technologies and preferences are defined, all
ingredients of a acneral equilibrium model have been provided .
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Demand is formalized as usual. For each vector of prices9 P = (PE, r, PB)
utility U(A, B) is maximized subject to a budget constraint : the value of con-
sumption of A and B cannot exceed the value of initial endowments . Under
appropriate (strict) concavity assumptions, this yields an aggregate demand
vector for commodities denoted (DA, DB), and a demand vector for inputs
denoted (DK, DE), for each price vector p. Formally :
(DA, DB, DK, DE) = D(PB, r, PE)
Supply is formalized as follows . At each price vector p = (pE, r, PB) a quantity
of inputs is supplied according to the supply functions PE = PE(E) and r =
r(K). We shall assume that E is produced in the South from an input x which
represents for example labor in the subsistence sector of the economy.
The producers of goods A and B use these inputs efficiently, and so that all
available capital and environmental resources are employed. This determines
the quantity of A and B produced,10 denoted (SA, SB) = S(PE, r, PB).
The excess demand function of the economy is therefore O(PB, r, PE) _
D(PB, r, PE) - S(PB, r, PE). Because the budget constraint is satisfied, at all
prices Walras Law is too : the value of excess demand equals zero :
(DA - f(K, E)) + PB(DB - g (K, E))
+ r.(DK - K(r)) + PE-(DE - E(PE)) = 0. (2)
A one region equilibrium is a price vector p* at which each of the four markets
clears" i.e . p* = 0 -i (0)( or p*E{O-1(0)}) . This is a standard definition of a
market equilibrium in a competitive market economy .
The two region model (North-South) general equilibrium model is construct-
ed as usual by considering two one-region models together, and relaxing the
hypothesis that each commodity market (for goods A and B) clears in each
region, so as to allow international trade . Input markets clear in each country
because factors (K and E) are not traded internationally. For the same reason,
in a world equilibrium the prices of these inputs could in principle be different
in the two countries although we prove below that at a world equilibrium all
prices, including input prices, are equal across the world economy.12
The two regions are assumed to be identical in most respects : same tech-
nologies, same inputs and produced goods, same utilities and the same supply
function for capital . The only difference between the regions is in the property
rights which will lead in turn to different supply functions 13 for the environmen-
tal common property resource E, to which we now turn .
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We shall consider two types of supply curves for the environmental common
property resource : one is the private supply curve, derived from the private
marginal cost curve of using or extracting the resource, the other the social
supply curve derived from the social marginal costs of use or extraction, and
which takes account of the negative externalities that each user has on others .
This is formalized in the following section, where we show that at each market
price the private14 supply curve provides more E than the social supply curve.
In the model we shall consider one supply curve for the North, its social supply
curve, and two for the South, both the social and the private supply curves. This
is because we assume that property rights for environmental common resources
in the North are sufficiently good that most social costs are internalized . The
North's social and private curves are therefore very close, and we assume they are
equal. On the other hand, in the South such property rights are not well-defined,
so that the private and social curves are quite different. This is substantiated in
the next section . Using the two different curves in the South, private and social,
leads to different concepts of comparative advantages and of gains from trade.
A new concept of comparative advantage must now be defined . Neither the
Ricardian nor Heckscher-Ohlin concepts can be utilized here: since technologies
are the same, Ricardian comparative advantage does not exist in our model, and
since the endowments of factors vary with their prices, the Heckscher-Ohlin
concept of comparative advantage is not well-defined here either. We adopt the
following definition: Region S is said to have a comparative advantage in the
production of good B, which is intensive in the use of the input E, when for
each price PE the supply of E relative to that of K in region S is larger than
the corresponding relative supply in region N at the same price. Obviously
this definition requires that we specify which supply curve is used: We shall
differentiate between public and private comparative advantages as follows .
Private comparative advantage in region S is defined by using the private
supply curve for E in the South; public comparative advantage is defined by
using the social supply curve for E . As we shall prove in the following section,
when property rights are less developed in the South, the South will exhibit a
private comparative advantage in the production of B, even though it has no
public comparative advantage .
Different supply curves will also give rise to different production possibility
sets . Consider at each price vector p the quantity of E supplied according to the
private supply curve E, and the corresponding quantity ofK = K(r). With these
two quantities of E and K we may compute the set of all possible combinations
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of outputs A and B which are feasible using the production functions f and g.
This set is denoted PP"(p) . Taking the union for all p, we obtain the private
production possibility set PPS" = UPPP' (p) , which we assume to be convex.
Performing the same procedure, but using the social supply curve yields the
public production possibility set PPS' = UPPP°(p), which is also convex .
At the world equilibrium price15 P* (PB*> r*N *N r*s *sw , PE > > PE ), with super-=
scripts indicating regions, the quantifies exported and imported of the two goods
A and B match: the world's excess demand vector is zero, i .e . p~ = owl (0) .
Note that the world's excess demand function ow(pw) is a function of five rela-
tive prices 16 with values in six markets : the markets for goods A and B, and two
markets for inputs K and E in each region (N and S). At the equilibrium price
p~ in each region the supply of capital matches its demand K(r*) = Dh(PI )
and the supply of the environmental resources matches its demand as well,
E(PE " ) = DE(pw) .
Gains from trade are defined as usual: they are given by the increase in utility
U (A, B) associated from a move from an equilibrium allocation in autarky (each
country in isolation) to a world equilibrium . Again wemust differentiate between
private and public gains. Public gains from trade are computed by comparing
welfare in autarky and at a world equilibrium, with respect to the model with
public production possibility sets. Private gainsfrom trade are defined in the
same fashion, but using the private production possibility sets.
Since private and public supply curves are similar in the North, the North's
public and private production possibility sets are also similar. Thus private and
public gains from trade are the same in the North. Not so in the South. The weaker
the property rights in the South, the larger will be the divergence between the
public and private supply curves, and between the private and public production
possibility sets . Thus the weaker the property rights in the South, the larger will
be the divergence between its private and its public gains from trade .
4. THE DYNANIICS OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES WITH DIFFER-
ENT PROPERTY RIGHTS
This section derives the supply curve for the renewable environmental resource E
under different property fight regimes . We study the dynamics of the population
of the renewable resource with and without economic use . From its steady state
behavior we derive the supply curve as a function of its price . Finally we show
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DYNANIICS OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
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H (Z)
Fig. 1 . The growth of the population increases with the population size until
there is overcrowding .
how the long run supply curve of the resource varies with the property fights
regimes .
4 .1 . The Dynamics of the Renewable Resource
A standard manner in which renewable resources - such as forests and fisheries
- are modeled is by assuming a "population growth curve" that describes the
demographic progress of the species . If z t is the stock or population size at
time t :
it = H(zt) . (3)
The function H is frequently assumed to have a form as depicted in Figure 1
below, implying that growth of the population increases with the population size
until there is overcrowding . This assumes that the species progresses within a
stable environment . A well known case is when H is quadratic in z,
z = H(z) = 0z - ,yz2 with 0,-y > O, (4)
which we now assume. This integrates to yield the classic logistic curve
zt = Oz,,/[1'z, + (Q - -yzo)exp(-)t)], (5)
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This logistic curve represents the population growth without economic interven-
tion and within a stable ecological environment. It has been used inter-alia to
describe the growth equation for the halibut in the Pacific .
Now assume that the resource is harvested for use as an input to production.
If Et (> 0) is the total harvest or "catch" at time t , the new growth equation
(ecology with economic intervention) then reads :
it = H(zt) - Et . (6)
Consider now a production function for the resource from inputs x . At each
stock level z we have
E = F(z, x)
where x is the total input, z is the stock and E is the quantity harvested or
extracted which we assume depends almost exclusively on the input x . If q is
the opportunity cost of the input, and PE is the market value of the resource,
both given by the market in a competitive framework, then net profit at time t is
7r t = PEF(zt, xt) - qx t , (8)
and optimal behavior under a private property regime implies that
which implies that
F = a1ax(F) = g1PE (9)
from which the problem is reduced to analyzing a single first order differential
equation . To fix ideas, consider for example the case where
F(z,x) = zax b ,0 < al b < 1, (10)
it = H(zt) - (PEb1q)b1(1_b)zt1(1-b) . (11)
In this case the long run or steady state solution to this problem requires analyzing
a single first order differential equation
H(zt) - (PEb1 q)b1(1-b)zt1( 1-b ) = 0 (12)
To study the stability of the steady state solution we postulate that the adjustment
mechanism for the input x is that the quantity of the input applied to harvesting
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
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Fig. 2. The larger steady state zs is stable under the assumptions .
the resource increases with profits as defined in (8) (see also Dasgupta and Heal,
1979, p . 122.) i .e .
.it = yr c , where > 0 . (13)
Typically (i .e . when a < 1-b)) there will be two steady states, given by the inter-
section of the curves H(t), a quadratic equation, and E(z) = (PE1gb)b1('-h)
zt/~t-6)) as illustrated in Figure 2. The larger steady state (denoted zs in Figure
2) is stable under (13) when az - 0, which we now assume. The solution path
of the adjustment process defined by (13) depends on its initial value; the natural
initial value is the long-run population size in its natural environment, i .e . the
long-run stock without economic encroachment, zo in Figure 2. In this event, the
population size tends in the long run to the steady state zs as illustrated in Figure
2 below, where z' is a function of TAE and q, zs = zs(PE/q). The corresponding
harvest or extraction is ES = E'(PE/q) .
4 .2 . Resource Supplies and Property Rights
The solution zs (PE/q) describes the long-run behavior of the stock of the
renewable resource E under private property regimes (equations 7 to 9) . Note
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Fig. 3 . The stable steady state of the resource is an increasing function of the
market price PE .
that ES = zs(PE/q) is an increasing function of the relative market value of the
resource, PE. This is because a larger value of PE leads to an upwards vertical
shift of the curve (pEb/q)b1(l-b)zt/(l-6) in Figure 2 which in turn implies a
larger steady state harvest and a correspondingly smaller steady state stock zs .
For each q, let
Es = Es(PE), ( 14 )
denote the supply curve ofthe resource E in a stable stationary state as a function
ofthe price PE. E'(pE) is an increasing function ofPE as illustrated in Figure 3 .
The curve E$(PE) in (14) is the social supply curve of the resource E as defined
in Section 3, since it is derived using (9), i.e . maximizing profits and internalizing
fully the impact of each unit extraction on the productivity ofthe following units.
Our next step is to study the variation of the stationary stock of E, or
equivalently of the steady state solution zs, with respect to different property
rights regimes . We wish to compare the supply curve for the resource with a
common; properly regime -with the social supply curve ES(PE) defined in (14) .
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4.3 . Comparative Dynamics of the Stock of Environmental Resources with
Respect to Property Rights
We wish to perform the comparative dynamics of the stock of the environmental
resource with respect to property rights regimes across stationary states . For
each properly rights regime, we must redefine the production function in (7)
above to reflect the extent to which the harvester takes into consideration the
externalities that its harvesting produces on the other harvesters at that regime.
Forexample, in theprivate property regime already discussed the harvester fully
internalizes the impact of its catch on the productivity of the next unit of input
by taking into account the marginal productivity of the catch (9) . With common
property resources this may not be the case, leading in a limiting case to the
so called "tragedy of the commons", as discussed below. In order to compare
the supply curves in each case, we shall now derive explicitly the cost curves
associated with the extraction of E from a common property resource pool, such
as a fishery. 17
Let there be N "harvesters" of a common properly resource, indexed i =
1, . . ., N. Let x, be the input of harvester ti to harvesting the common property
resource E. Let x = 1:N1 xi . We assume that the inputs of all harvesters are
identical and interchangeable, so that for each stock z the total harvest can be
expressed as a function E = F(x) of the total input. We also assume that
all harvesters are symmetric, so that for a stock z each harvester obtains as
its output a fraction of the total output equal to the fraction that it supplies of
the total input, formally Ei = F(x)(x i lx). These are all natural and standard
assumptions, as in Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Chapter 3. We assume that for
a stock z, each harvester chooses its input level xi to maximize the value of
its share of outputs net of costs, PEEj(xi) - q .xi, taking as given the output
levels of others, Ej for j $ i. Here PE is the market induced price of the
resource, which is an exogenous parameter for the competitive harvester, and
q is the "opportunity cost" of the input xi . We are therefore modeling a Nash
equilibrium pattern of use of a common property resource . Finally, F(x) is
assumed to be strictly concave, so that for each stock z the production of the
environmental good E is characterized by strictly diminishing returns, arising
perhaps from the application of increasing mounts of variable input x to a fixed
body of land or water. Under these conditions we show in the following lemma
that the private supply curve of the common property resource lies below the
social supply curve.
32
	
GRACIELA CI-IICHILNISKY
Lemma 1 Under the assumptions listed above theprivate supply curvefor the
common property resource lies below the social supply curve, so that at each
price more resources are supplied under common property than it is socially
optimal.
Proof. Consider a given level of the stock z, and let F(z, x) = F(x) . Then the
marginal product of the input x is F'(x), and the average product is F(x)lx .
Observe that by strict concavity, F(x)/x > F'(x) . Look first at marginal prod-
ucts . The private marginal product of the input is denoted Pmp and the social
marginal product is Smp . With identical harvesters, if harvester i uses inputs
xi, his/her yield is by assumption yt = x;F(x)l x, i .e . average yield per unit of
input times amount of input. So harvester is production function for E is given
by
Now,
Hence under the assumptions
yt(xt) = x,-F(x)lx .
Pmpi = dldx;[x,F(x)lx] =
d/dxt[x,-F(xt + x_,-)]/(x,- + x_t) where x-i = ~xJ.
Pmpi = F(x)lx -}- xi{(xF'(x) - F(x)llx2} (15)
= F(x)lx + (xtl x){F'(x) - F(x)lx) .
This analysis is independent of the number of harvesters as long as there is more
than one, N > 1 . Note that as the number of harvesters becomes very large, xi lx
goes to zero, and the private marginal product becomes the average product. In
this limiting case we recover the well-known result that harvesters equate input
prices to average return rather than to marginal product, the basis of the "tragedy
of the commons". Our results, however, do not rely on any limiting assumptions
on the number of harvesters . Since Smp; = F'(x),
Smp; - Pmpt = F(x) - F(x)lx - (xtlx)[F'(x) - F(x)lx] (16)
= [F (x) - F(x)/x][I - x,-Ix] < 0.
Therefore the social marginal product of the input is lower that the private one,
and the curve in Figure 3 if defined with common property resources, is higher
than thecurve E(z) defined underaprivate property regime . Since F is aconcave
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as we wished to prove .
Fig. 4 . The stable steady state extraction under common property regimes is
larger than that under private property .
function of x, this implies that for each given z and at each value of PE, the
stable steady state quantity harvested under a common properly regimes PE-1
(Figure 4) is larger than the corresponding amount E' under private property.
Or, equivalently, the long run steady state of the stock denoted is smaller in
the case of common property resources than the same steady state with private
property. In a limiting case the extraction with common property regimes is
sufficiently high that no steady state with a positive stock exists (Figure 5). The
species eventually disappears .
Since the optimal catch curve is now higher for each z, then for z = Pzs we
obtain the relation between the harvest size and its price, i.e . the private supply
curve PE' of the resource E . This is an increasing function of PE giving a larger
steady state harvest of E (and a smaller steady state of the stock) for each price
pE than does the social supply curve E'(PE) in (14), i.e . for all PE,
PE'(PE) > E(PE) ( 17 )
Figure 6 illustrates the private and social supply curves for the environmen-
tal resource E. The social supply curve is obtained by equating the opportunity
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A
H(z)
z
Fig. S. Extinction of the Species in the Long Run
cost q with the value of Smpt, q = PE . F'(Z ) . Instead, the private supply curve
is obtained by equating :
q = Pmp;-FE
5. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE
We shall now use the results of Section 4 to study the behavior of competitive
and unregulated markets, by analyzing the properties of the market equilibria of
the North-South model defined in Section 3.
We already observed that the South specializes in the export of environmen-
tally intensive goods, such as timber, cash crops requiring forest clearing such
as palm oil and sugar, and other resource intensive commodities . In this section
we shall establish that a reason for this is that common property resources are
overused in the South, because the true social costs of intensive environmental
use are not properly computed. This is also true in some measure in the North .
However, we shall argue that the divergence between private and social costs is
much larger in the South than it is in the North- This divergence causes the South
to specialize in the export of environmentally intensive goods . The divergence
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PE
E
Fig. 6 . The socially optimal supply curve is the social supply curve which
internalizes all externalities (under private property regimes) . The social supply
curve supplies less resources at each price than does the private supply curve.
between private and social costs is, in turn, explained by the lack of property
rights in common property pools from which the resource is extracted .
Consider the North-South model where the environment enters as an input
of production, E. Environmental inputs will be shown to have a particularly
pronounced effect on the pattern of international trade . This can be seen as
follows .
Recall that our model has price-dependent supply functions for environmen-
tal resources, given by PE = PE(E), where PE is the price of a unit of the
environmental resource E. The importance of this price dependence became
clear in Lemma l where we proved that the supplyfunction ofan environmental
resource depends on the nature of the property rightsfor that resource. This in
turn will determine the patterns of trade .
Consider the common property resource E. If there are no regulations con-
cerning the use of the resource and no enforceable private property rights in this
resource, then the cost to an individual of extracting an additional unit of E as
an input of production will be relatively low. This will merely reflect the private
costs such as e.g . in the case of a fishery, the private costs of catching, and in
the case of an aquifer, the private costs of obtaining the water. They will not
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reflect the full impact on society of the use of the resource, which :n the case
of the fishery could eventually be the depletion of the stock. In the case of the
aquifer this could be damage from overuse such as the salination which takes
place when water levels fall below critical levels (Dasgupta, 1982) . If however
externalities are fully internalized (by regulation or by property rights) so that
the cost to an individual of using the resource reflects fully the social costs of
its use, then the private costs will be higher and could increase rapidly with the
level of use (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, Chapter 3).
Differences in the structure of property rights in the extraction of the resource
that is used as an input of production will therefore be reflected in differences in
the supply conditions of that resource . In industrial democracies property rights
are better established and more widely enforceable than in developing countries,
and regulatory policies designed to internalize costs of using an environmental
resource (such as polluting clean air with automobile exhaust fumes, or burning
coal for heating purposes) are more widespread and widely enforced . This is
due in part to the large costs associated with a legal infrastructure and a system
of enforcement and control: such costs are relatively more accessible to rich
industrial countries .
If the two regions are identical but only in the North are property rights for the
environmental resource well-defined, then the private costs of an environmental
resource as an input of production will be higher in an industrial democracy than
those in a low income country. In both countries the social costs are the same,
but in the low income country the private costs may be well below social costs .
We saw in Lemma 1 that this implies that the supply for environmental resources
will be larger (a larger slope of the supply curve) at each level of prices in the
low income countries (the South) than in the industrial countries (the North) . In
general, the larger the divergence between private and social resource costs, the
larger will be the divergence between social gains from trade and private gains
from trade . When social prices differ widely from private prices what appears as
a relative advantage may actually be a relative disadvantage . We can therefore
expect that considering trade in a world where environment is a crucial input
whose supplies are "abundant" in the South because of the divergence between
private and social costs, will lead to substantial economic implications . This will
be discussed below.
We may consider a wide variation in property rights, indeed a continuum
of these, parameterized by the slope of the supply curve for the environmental
resource used as an input of production. 'I\vo limiting cases will be explored :
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when the input is a common property resource, and when the input is instead
privately owned. Between these two limiting cases there is a wide variety of
property rights regimes in which the input is partly private and partly commonly
owned. As long as the input is not entirely private, the supply of the resource
is determined without fully accounting for the costs of each individual's use to
others, and therefore the extraction of the resource will yield a flatter curve, one
which is more responsive to the market price of the input, than would be the
case under a private property regime.
Observe that when the resource is privately owned, owned for example by
one firm, or by a small cooperative of peasants in the region,18 then the private
and the social supply curves (or marginal cost curves) are one and the same. Our
assumption is that this is often the case in an industrial democracy, and indeed
many practical examples exist to substantiate this assumption. But this is often
not the case in developing countries . This means that in an industrial democracy,
which we call the North, there is essentially one price-dependent supply curve
for the environmental resource (private and social costs being the same) while
in the South there are two different curves, the private and the social curves. The
social curve is a theoretical curve which would emerge if property rights were
well defined in the South.
The private curve prevails in setting up the patterns of trade in free markets.
For the same input, under the same production conditions, this difference in
property rights leads to different effective supply curves in the North than in
the South: a lower and flatter curve in the South. This is quite independent of
any assumptions on input prices or in any other prices . The difference simply
reflects the lack of property rights .
When social costs differ substantially from private costs and property rights
are not well established, the social cost of the environmental input is substantially
underestimated by market prices . This means that at the same price much more
of the input would be provided than would be socially optimal. In other words,
the South, because of lacking property rights, appears to have a relatively higher
supply of environmental resources at each price than does the North. Indeed, at
each price, the supplies offered will be higher than they ought to be if proper
social costs were computed .
The reality could be very different from the appearances . Even though here we
assumed for simplicity that the two regions are identical, it is clear that the point
is rather --;feral.For example, when social costs are computed, the South could
have a comparative disadvantage in the production of environmentally intensive
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goods even if it exhibits a private comparative advantage. E .g . the social cost
of extracting the same amount of environmental resources could be higher in
the South, due for example to a relatively smaller total stock. Everything else
being equal, the lack of property rights in the South explains why the South
specializes in the exports of environmentally intensive goods . This occurs with
the functioning of markets in a classical model of trade through comparative
advantages . Here, however, the comparative advantages are not real : they derive
from a market failure to compute the true social costs of the environmental input.
Theorem l Consider the North-South model where both regions have the same
technologies, the same homoth eticpreferences, and the same natural endowment
of environmental inputs ie . the same social supply curves . The model as defined
in the Appendix has at most one competitive equilibrium . If the South has ill-
definedproperty rightsfor the environmental input e.g . the resource is extracted
from a common property pool. Then at a world equilibrium the two regions
will trade, and the South will export environmentally intensive goods . The South
will exhibit private gains from trade (as defined in Section 3) but in a steady
state it extracts more environmental resources . and itproduces and exports more
environmentally intensive goods (B) than is Pareto efficient .
Proof. Recall our assumption that the two regions are identical, but the South's
supply of E is given by the private supply curve pE'(PE) while the North's is its
social supply E'(PE) . Consider the map from the world equilibrium commodity
prices PA . and pB " to equilibrium factor prices in each region r* and PE'
19 .
Under these conditions, at the world equilibrium price vector pw, factor prices
will be the same in the two regions, pE " and r* (see Appendix) . However, since
the supply curve of environmental resources in the South, pE'(PE), was shown
in Lemma 1 to be lower than the supply curve E'(PE " ) in the North, at the
world's equilibrium price vector pl, the South supplies more environmental
resources than the North (Figure 6). It follows that at p* the South produces a
larger amount of B than does the North, since the production of B is intensive in
the input E, which is more abundant in the South (see also Chichilnisky, 1981,
1986).
Note that since the two regions have the same homothetic utilities, and at
pti the two regions face the same relative prices for goods A and B, the North
and the South demand goods A and B in the same proportions . Therefore, at
the equilibrium price vector p* both regions demand the same proportion of A
and B, but the supply of B in the South is proportionately larger. It follows that
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when the international markets clear, the South must export B, and the North
import B, i .e . the South is an exporter of environmentally intensive goods at the
world equilibrium . A computation of world equilibrium prices in this model and
a proof of theft uniqueness, is in the Appendix.
Now consider a different world equilibrium (denoted by the equilibrium
prices p* ) where the South's property rights are well defined and therefore the
supply ofE is given by the social supply function E' (pE).2° By assumption this
equilibrium is unique, and by the first welfare theorem, the equilibrium allocation
is Pareto efficient. In particular the quantity of environmental resources E used
and the amount of B produced in the South is Pareto efficient at the equilibrium
pE, with E* = E'(pE ).
Now as shown above, in the world equilibrium (p* ) where the South has ill-
defined property rights and therefore has a private supply curve for E, pE'(PE),
the quantity of B produced by the South exceeds the quantity supplied by the
North (which equals the Pareto optimum B*) . Similarly, the quantity of E
extracted at this new equilibrium, E* = E'(pE )), exceeds the same quantity
at the equilibrium p**, which is E* = E'(pE). Therefore at p* the South uses
more resources (E) and exports more environmentally intensive goods (B) than
is is Pareto efficient, as we wished to prove .
Note that the environmental overuse described in Theorem 1 is induced by
a competitive market response to the lack of property rights in the South:
Corollary 1 Free and competitive trade leads to the equalization ofall goods
andfactorprices and in particular equalizes theprice ofenvironmentalresources
used as hVuts in the two regions. Yet the South uses more environmental
resources than the North (and more than is Pareto optimal) unless property
rightsfor the common property resources are improved in the South. ifproperty
rights are not improved in the South, then its exports of environmentally inten-
sive goods are its domestic production would have to be curtailed in order to
achieve patterns of consumption which duplicate the North's social optimum.
The equalization offactor prices is established in the Appendix.
The corollary follows directly from Theorem 1 and Lemma l . The interest of
this corollary is to emphasize that the overuse of environmental resources by the
South is not necessarily caused by their prices being lower in the South than in
the North, as is often thought. Equalizing prices through the international market
will not resolve the problem of the world's overuse of environmental resources .
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6. PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICIES
Consider, for example, a policy which improves the property fights of Amazo-
nian small farmers such as rubber-tappers . This will change the supply function
of Amazonian resources such as land, trees and biodiversity, and in turn affect
relative input prices. It will in turn change the computation ofcomparative advan-
tages and of gains from trade from agricultural exports based on deforestation of
the Amazon. Production patterns will shift . Export patterns . will reflect more ful-
ly the social cost of deforesting the Amazon. Examples of such property rights
approach are provided by recent agreements involving debt-for-nature swaps
(Ruitenbeck, 1990), which change property rights in the expectation of protect-
ing environmental resources . Another example is provided by recent agreements
between the US pharmaceutical industry and Costa Rica among other countries.
The spearhead of this project is a pair of ingenious efforts to exploit the forests to
obtain medicinal products . The plans were described at a Symposium at Rocke-
feller University, January 1992, organized jointly by the Rain Forest Alliance, a
non profit organization, and the New York Botanical Garden's Institute of Eco-
nomic Botany.21 A Costa Rican research institute (INBIO) is prospecting for
promising plants, microorganisms and insects to be screened for medical uses by
Merck and Company, the world's largest drug company. Merck & Co ., in turn, is
supporting the prospecting effort financially and will share any resulting profits
with Costa Rica i.e . will share property rights on biodiversity, see Chichilnisky
(1993) . The Costa Rican government, which has set aside 25 percent of its land
as forest preserves, will use the royalties and some of the initial payments to
support the conservation efforts . In another effort, a small Californian compa-
ny, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, is tapping the expertise of traditional healers -
"shamans" or medicine people - in various parts of the tropics . This company
has already isolated a compound from a medicinal plant in South America that
it says is active against the influenza and herpes virus . Shaman has flied a patent
and the drug is into clinical trials . The company intends to promote the con-
servation of the forests by channeling some of its profits back to the localities
whose medicine people provided the key plants i .e . sharing property rights . The
theory behind both ventures is that everybody wins: the world gets new drugs,
the pharmaceutical companies earn profits, and people in the localities are justly
compensated for their "intellectual property" and their conservation and col-
lection efforts . Examples of highly successful medical rain forest discoveries
include aspirin, morphine, the curare plant, discovered in the 1930's, taxol,
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and the discovery in the 1960's that the rosy periwinkle could be used to treat
childhood leukemia and Hodgkin's disease.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We showed that different property rights regimes for environmental resources
can account for the pattern of trade between the North and the South. The
South exports environmentally intensive goods even if it is not well endowed
with them. We have discussed several examples of policies which could lead to
the improvement of property rights in the developing countries, particularly in
the case of biodiversity from rain forests . Improving the property rights of the
local populations will lead to higher prices for the environmental inputs, lower
extraction and exports by the South, and lower consumption by the North. All in
all, property fights improvements in the South could check the main economic
source of overuse: prices which are below social costs.
Similar examples hold for land resources. Recently thegovernment ofEcuador
allocated a piece of the Amazon of the size of the US state of Connecticut to
its Indian population, a clear property rights policy.22 Under the conditions of
our theorem, this policy should lead to a better use of the forests' resources and
to a more balanced pattern of trade between Ecuador and the US. Jose Maria
Cabascango, the representative of the Indigenous Nationalities ofEcuador which
comprises about two million people, has expressed resistance to the overuse of
the Amazon for oil exploitation, or for growing cash crops for the international
market. Several other examples of property rights policies were presented in
some detail in Section 5 . In particular, we discussed the property rights agree-
ments of Merck and Co., the largest pharmaceutical firm in the world, in the
Costa Rica rain forest (INBIO) and of Shaman Pharmaceuticals in Central and
South America, see Chichilnisky (1993) .
It is true, however, that property rights may change slowly because they
require expensive legal infrastructure and enforcement. Poor countries may find
themselves unable to quickly accommodate such policies . But the improvement
of property fights of indigenous populations in developing countries, which
make up most of the world's population, should certainly be considered a major
policy goal . This represents a small but apparently growing trend in Brazil,
Bolivia, Columbia. Ecuador, the French Guyana and Venezuela. Support from
international organizations in establishing legal frameworks and enforcing the
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fights of indigenous populations should be most desirable . Reciprocally, any
policy designed to remove the rights of locals and increase the land available
for cash crops oriented solely to the exports market should be suspect . Indeed,
recent studies show that 90% ofthe tropical deforestation occurs with the purpose
of transforming forests for agricultural use, much of it for cash crops for the
international market (Amelung, 1991 ; Barbier et al ., 1991, 1992 ; Binkley and
Vincent, 1990; Hyde and Newman, 1991) . The World Bank's emphasis on
exports of agricultural cash crops as a foundation for development is in this light
contradictory with the North's stated desire to preserve global environmental
assets . Such policy contradictions should be resolved immediately, since they
lead to an enormous and dangerous waste of resources .
But property fights are only one manifestation of the North-South dilemma,
one of its causes . There are outer closely related causes : the endemic poverty
experienced in many developing countries, particularly in those regions which
have historically specialized in the export of environmentally intensive products,
such as cash crops and minerals, namely Latin America and Africa . 'I\vo thirds
of Latin American exports' today consist of resources, and the African countries
exhibit larger proportions (Chichilnisky and Heal, 1987).
An intriguing link between overuse of resources and poverty was established
in Chichilnisky (1991) : any policy which leads to lower prices of resources will
also lead to more overuse; this is due to poverty and the accompanying income
effects . Another somewhat unexpected aspect of property rights policies is that
they may be a precondition for successful taxation of environmental use . In the
short run, taxes or outright bans on the use of environmental inputs such as forest
products are seen as preferable since they require less fundamental changes than
those implied by property rights . But taxes may only work appropriately when
the property rights on environmental resources are improved (Chichilnisky,
1991) . Legislation allowing indigenous peoples in Latin America and Africa to
bring to the World Courts claims for their rights could work in tandem with taxes
levied on the use of environmental resources towards checking the overuse of
resources .
In summary: property rights policies, either through government action or
through private enterprise as in the examples offered here, provide a hopeful,
almost a necessary, foundation for resolving the North-South environmental
dilemma. Improving property rights should also lead to better, more balanced
income patterns, since one of the most direct causes of poverty in the developing
countries is the lack of entitlement for land and resources (Dasgupta, 1983).
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Similarly, as we have shown here, poverty can prevent environmental policies
based on taxation to work its intended effects. Poverty and environmental abuse
have a common root, and both are the core of the North-South environmental
dilemma.
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APPENDIX
A. THE NORTH-SOUTH MODEL AND ITS SOLUTIONS
This Appendix provides a general equilibrium formulation of the North-South
model where one of the inputs of production in the South is a common prop-
erty resource . Factor endowments in the two countries are not fixed as in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, but are variable, depending on factor prices . In this
sense the model follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) but here the factor supply
curves have slopes which depend on the property rights for the common property
resource (as in Section 4) while in Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) factors are private
goods. In addition, Chichilnisky (1986) considers different technologies in the
two regions, while here the technologies and the preferences are identical in the
two countries . Except for the variable factor endowments, the model follows an
Arrow-Debreu formulation of two competitive economies trading with each oth-
er. A comparison of the welfare properties of an equilibrium in the North-South
model and the Arrow-Debreu model can be found in Chichilnisky (1990) .
To simplify notation and computation we consider constant returns to scale
production functions and simple utilities . The model and its results are extend-
able to a wide variety of utility functions and demand specifications and to
Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions, but at the cost of significantly
longer computations . For such extensions see Chichilnisky (1993) .
We specify first one economy : the South . It produces goods A and B using
two inputs : E and K. We consider a fixed proportions technology in each sector,
although there is substitution of factors at the aggregate level, as is shown
below, because endowments are variable, see Figure 7 . Efficient production
plans satisfy B 1 = EB lar = KB lcr, and As = EA /a2 = KA /c2, where the
superscript s denotes supply. Recall that EA + EB = E 3 varies with prices and
so does KA + KB = Ks.
We assume that B is more resource intensive than A so that D = (arc2 -
a2cr) > 0. The following equations define an equilibrium . Competitive behavior
on the part of the firms assures zero profits :
PA = alpE + crr (Al)
PB = a2PE + c2r (A2)
where PA and PB are the prices of A and B respectively, PE is the price of the
resource . anui r is the rental on capital . As shown in Section 4, the environmental
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Fig. 7. As PB changes, so do factor prices r and PE (A 1 and A2) and therefore
factor endowments K' and E$ vary . For each set of factor endowments we
have a different production possibility set. As pB varies, therefore, we obtain
the overall production possibility set shaded above. This exhibits substitution
in the use of the two factors : capital K and environmental resources, E . The
substitution occurs through changes in the output mix.
resource E supplied in equilibrium E' is an increasing function ofPE - for any
given q. To simplify the computation of solutions we assume here a simple form
of this relation :
E' = aPE IPB + E° (M)
where a > 0 depends on the property rights regimes for E as established in
Section 4, Lemma l : a large a represents ill-defined property rights, such as
the case of common property resources, and a small a represents better defined
property rights for the resource E, such as private property. The parameter a
can vary as a continuum, indicating ,a variety of "shades" of property rights
between the two extreme cases . Because of Lemma 1 we know that the less are
the externalities which one harvester produces to others internalized, the larger
will be the slope of E', a. Similarly
K' = Qr -+- K (A4)
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where Q > 0; everything that follows applies for Q = 0 as well, i .e . when Ks is
a constant. For a given property rights regime, factor supplies vary with factor
prices, so that the overall production possibilityfrontier exhibits substitution in
the total use of capitaland environmental resources, see Figure 7 . In equilibrium
all markets clear:
Es = Ed (AS)
Ks = Kd (A6)
Ed = EA + EB = Bsal + A2a2 (A7)
Kd = KB + KA = Bs cl + A' C2 (A8)
Bs = Bd + XB A9
As = Ad + XA (A 10)
where XB and XAd denote exports ?, ,.id imports of A respectively, and
PBXB = PAXA (All)
i.e . the value of exports equals the value of imports. The North is specified by a
set of equations similar to (A1) to (A11) with the same technology parameters
and the same capital supply functions, but with different supply functions (A3)
for environmental resources, as explained in Section 4, denoted E'(N) . In a
world equilibrium, the prices of the trade goods (A and B) are equal and exports
match imports :
where (S) and (N) denote the North and South respectively. Since the economies
are identical except for property fights, in the two regions there are nine exoge-
nous parameters : a l , a2, Ch c2, O,K, E°, and a(N) and a(S). We add a price
normalization condition
PA = 1 (A16)
and obtain a total of twenty six independent equations, (Al) to (All) for the
North and for the South, plus (A 12) to (A 16). There are in total twenty eight
endogenous variables, fourteen for each region : PA, PB, PE, r, Es, Ed, Ks , Kd,
PA(N) = PA(S) (A12)
PB(N) = PB(S) (A13)
XA(N) = XA(S) (A14)
Xg(S) = XB(N) (A15)
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Fig. 8. The utility function U(A, B) has indifference curves as indicated above .
For a larger price range, the demand for A is Ad
. .
A', Ad, B', Bd , X.,, X,d, so the system is under determined so far up to two
variables, which reflects the fact that demand has not been specified yet. We
consider a demand specification which allows us to obtain simple analytics;
more general utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas can be considered at the
cost of more computation without affecting the results. Consider the utility
function
U(A,B)=B+kifA> Ad* ,k>0, and
U(A, B) = B + -yA otherwise , -y = +k/Ad* > 0
Then as shown in Figure 8, for PB > -y, agents demand Ad* so by choosing k
and -y in U appropriately, we may assume:
Ad(N) = Ad
.
(N) (A17)
and
Ad(S) = Ad
.
(S) (A18)
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We have thus a system of twenty eight equations on twenty eight variables,
depending on nine exogenous parameters . The economies of the two regions
are identical except for the parameters a(N) and a(S) which depend on the
property rights for the common property resource in each region . We shall say
that property fights are better defined in the North when a(N) > a(S) ; both
countries have the same property rights when a(N) = a(S).
By inverting equations (A7) and (A8) we obtain
and
where D=aic2 - a2ci >0.
B. PROOFOF UNIQUENESS OF AN EQUILIBRIUM
The North-South model with property rights has at most onecompetitive equilib-
riumfor any given set ofparameters a(S) and a(N) representing the structure
ofproperty rights in the two regions.
Proof. From (A 15) (A17) and (A 18) we have
Inverting (A1) and (A2) we obtain
Ad
.
(S) - As (S) = As(N) - A
d.
(N) (A19)
PE = (PBc2 - ci)/D and r = (al - PBa2)/D
where D = aic2 - cla2 > O . (A20)
We may now rewrite (A 19) as a function of one variable only, pB . Substituting
equations (A3), (A4), (A20), (A21), and (A16) into (A19) we obtain :
P2B[,'(S)+'I'(N)]+PB[Ad*(S)+Ad*(N)+r(S)+r(N)]-[P(S)+P(N)] = 0
(A21)
where q' = 0ala2/D P = ac2l /D2 and r = (1/D)[clE°-alK+(1/D)(acic2-
pal a2)] . This is a quadratic equation in PB which has at most one positive root
because the constant terns is negative . Therefore there is at most one equilibrium
price pH . From. T)*-.) we can obtain in each country the equilibrium levels of all
B3 = (c2E - a2K)/D (A7/ )
A' = (alK - cIE)/D (A8/)
other variables: PE and r' from (Al) and (A2), E'' and K'' from (A3) and
(A4), B'* and A'' from (A7~ and (A8'), Xdd ' from A'', Ad
.
, and Xg from
(A11), so the (unique) full equilibrium of the model is computed.
At a world equilibrium factor prices are the same in both regions: this obtains
from equation (A20) noting that by (A 12) and (A 13) Pa (1V) = Pe (S)-
Note that in order to simplify computations, we have taken utility functions
which effectively make the demand for A in each region an exogenously chosen
parameter at an equilibrium. This follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1986), where it
is also shown that the results generalize to more general utilities and demand
functions.
NOTES
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2. Such as e.g . problems related to acid rain, global warming and the preservation of
rainforests. One hundred nations agreed to consider a treaty to reduce the threat of
global warming at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992. In Vancouver, February 1991
a pact was adopted that establishes a framework for a treaty linking environmental
policy to economic issues of interest to industrial and developing countries, such
as the remission of international sovereign debt and transfer of technology.
3 . W. Baumol and W. Oates (1975), I. Walter (1975), W. Oates (1991) J.A . Tobey
(1990) and others have studied the effects that environmental control measures
could have on patterns of international trade. Some of these studies have found
measurable effects . All these studies focuson the policy aspects of measures to con-
trol pollution rather than on our issue: how differences in property rights regimes
can explain trade between countries in free markets, and the patterns of environ-
mental use. The general concern that developing countries develop an advantage
in pollution-intensive industries, known as the "pollution heaven hypothesis" has
been studied by I . Walter and J. Ugelow (1979) and I. Waiter (1982). The potential
implication of policy measures to protect the environment on international trade
was also studied by Krutilla (1976), Maier (1976, 1990x), Chichilnisky (1982,
1985,1988b) . On the other hand, Dasgupta (1990) points out that the literature on
development economics and the environment is largely undeveloped. The inter-
national trade literature has not taken up the issue of property rights differentials
affecting the pattern of trade, nor considered trade patterns in a general equilib-
rium model with common property inputs . To the extend that externalities have
been studied in international trade, they refer to production externalizes in a partial
50
	
GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY
equilibrium framework, see e.g . Dixit and Norman (1980) . Instead, we study a gen-
eral equilibrium model with variable endowments of acommon property resource
which is an input to production, having supplies which depend on property rights .
4 . Recent studies show that 90% of ail tropical deforestation is for the agricultural use
of forests, particularly for the international market (Amelung, 1991 ; Barbier et al .,
1991, 1992; Binkley and Vincent, 1990; Hyde and Newman, 1991).
5 . Traditional societies managed common property resources often succesfully, using
cultural custom enforced by punishment, in what can be described as repeated
games strategies, see Chichilnisky, G . (1994) ; in the transition to industrialization
traditional practices cease to work succesfully because populations are larger and
more transient, and more formal, individualistic, property rights are often needed
instead.
6. The term "comparative advantage" encompasses two different definitions : one
originates in the classical work of Ricardo (1817) with one input of production
(labor); the other in the two country, two factor, two good Heckscher-Ohlin model
(Ohlin, 1933 ; Jones, 1956, 1965) . In the former, labor produces goods A and B.
Labor requirements per unit of A at Home is aLA and for B is aLB and the same
numbers for the foreign country are aL A and aL B respectively. Then Home has
a comparative advantage in A if the ratio of the unit requirement in A to that
of B is lower at Home than in the foreign country, i .e . aLA/aLB < a!Al aLB*
In other words, if Home's relative productivity in A is higher than it is in B,
Home has a comparative advantage in the production of A. In the two input two
good Heckscher-Ohlin model the relative advantage is measured instead not by the
relative productivity of labor in the two sectors of the country (since technologies
are typically the same in the two countries) but rather by the relative abundance
of the two factors which enter as inputs in the production of the two goods A and
B. Here A and R are produced using capital K and labor L . The total supply
of L and K are fixed in each country, e.g . at home L = Lo and K = KO ;
in Foreign, L = Lo and K = Ko . Let .9 be more labor intensive than B in
both countries . Then Home has a comparative advantage in the production of A
if the ratio LO/KO >_ Lo /Ko . In this case Home will export A and Foreign B.
Gainsfrom trade are measured by considering welfare before international trade
(in autarky) and after trade (in a world market equilibrium) . Typically gains from
trade emerge from an expanded choice set, since in autarky the countries consume
what they produce, while when trade takes place they consume what they can
afford in the budget set which is determined by international prices and what they
produce. The latter set is typically larger than the former, because the former is the
production possibility set of the country, while the latter is a half space containing
the production possibility set.
7 . The supply of the resource E depends also on the opportunity cost of the input
used to harvest it, q as shown in Lemma 1 below. The North-South model of
Chichilnisky (1981) has in general different welfare properties from those of the
Arrow-Debreu model, for example, the competitive equilibria need not be Pareto
efficient, see e.g . Chichilnisky (1990) .
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8. This has the advantage of avoiding problems of aggregation . Chichilnisky and Heal
(1983) established necessary and sufficient conditions on individual preferences
for the existence of a well-defined community preference.
9 . In an equilibrium the prices of the inputs, PE and r, are related to those of the
outputs, PB .
10. This gives the quantities of goods A and B produced by profit maximizing pro-
ducers, when both factor markets clear. Note that as is standard in constant returns
economies there may be no well-defined partial equilibrium supply function for
each producer without the additional assumption of full employment of factors .
11 . Because Walras Law is satisfied, it suffices that all but one markets clear ; with
non-zero prices, the last market will clear automatically.
12. Effectively the factor markets in each country are different markets under this
assumption, and achieve different prices in an equilibrium . This is a standard
specification . Under certain conditions, discussed in the Appendix, factor prices
will equalize across the two regions at an equilibrium even though the factors, K
and E, are not traded.
13 . This assumption is made to emphasize the patterns of trade which are due to
differences in property rights between the two regions. This assumption can be
relaxed or weakened to consider different technologies and preferences across the
regions, see Chichilnisky (1986) .
14 . E(PE) is the inverse function of PE (E); it is assumed to exist and to be continuous.
15 . Conditions to insure the existence and uniqueness ofan equilibrium in this model are
given in Chichilnisky (1986) ; the Appendix to this paper establishes the uniqueness
of the equilibrium .
16 . Namely pB, rN , rs , PE, if e.g . PA = 1 .
17 . This analysis differs from other approaches to the study of the costs or the value of
common resources, for example that of HJ. Ruitenbeck (1990) who is concerned
with the value of a rainforest from the point of view of establishing the correct
amount of a transfer to an LDC from the rest of the world, to prevent deforestation
in the LDC. His definition is closer to a "shadow" price ; we seek instead those
general equilibrium prices actually prevailing in the market, in connection with
different property rights regimes .
18 . The economic characteristics of the owners matter. For example, (see Chichilnisky,
1991) the properties of the supply curve of the resource depend on the endow-
ments and the utilities of the harvesters. Here we have assumed that a harvester'
endowment is only labor. The opportunity cost of labor is q .
19 . The existence of such a function within this North-South model it is established
in Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) for the case where the two regions have the same
constant returns to scale production functions without substitution, and it is also
true for functions with substitution such as Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to
scale .
20. When resource supplies in both regions are given by the social supply curves,
i.e . when both countries have well defined property rights, the countries do no
trade la Nuilibrium, because they are identical in every way. This is an extreme
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specification which is easily relaxed . In general, when both countries operate at
their social supply curves for E, trade will take place when either the technologies
or the demand are different across the two regions .
21 . See for example the report in Science Times, science supplement to the New York
Times, January 28, 1992, page C 1 .
22 . Indian groups will gain title to land in Pastaza Province, a traditional homelands
area covering 4,305 square miles in eastern Ecuador. Ecuador's move is part of
a wider trend in the Amazon basin . Achuar, Shiwiar and Quechua Indians will
soon administer an area where population density averages five people per square
mile . In the last three years, the Governments of Ecuador, Columbia and Venezuela
have restricted most of their Amazon areas as national parks of Indian reserves,
as have Brazil and Bolivia, and France has made plans to protect a third of the
French Guyana. Last year, a coalition of Amazon Indians and foreign and local
environmentalists helped force oil companies to abandon plans for producing
oil in Ecuador's Amazon. Today another coalition is waging a similar campaign
against another oil project. Ecuador, one of South America's poorest countries,
draws currently about 50% of its tax revenues from oil exports . In the highlands
of Ecuador. Indian groups have expressed similar resistance to export oriented
farming . Jose Mafia Cabascango, a leader of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
which is said to represent the nation's estimated two million Indians, states : "We
should only produce food for our own consumption" 'The Amazon region has
a very fragmented ecology and to continue colonization would destroy it" . See
e.g . James Brooke,New York Times, Sunday September 6, 1992, p . 10-L . Similar
concerns were expressed by Antonio Macedo, Coordinator of the National Council
of Rubber-Tappers of the Amazon, of Cruzeiro do Sul, Acre, Brazil, in a recent
interview at Columbia University, New York, December 7, 1992 .
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